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COMMENT
The Myth of Reverse Race Discrimination:
An Historical Perspective
N THE 1960'S, THROUGH LONG SUMMERS of racial violence and civil
disorders, the disruption of the lives of white America brought
home black America's message: discrimination against them, as a
class of people, would no longer be tolerated.' Theoretically, discrim-
ination ends when all persons are treated equally. 2 In practice, how-
ever, the effects of discrimination are far-reaching and the concept
of equal treatment is illusory. A black wo/man* denied an education
or the opportunity to work at some time in the past remains dis-
advantaged in the present job market where s/he* competes with
others not similarly denied. Equal opportunity, therefore, takes on
new meaning when viewed in terms of the past as well as the present
and the future.3
The solution thus far, to the elimination of the present effects
of past discrimination, has been termed affirmative action by some
and preferential treatment by others. This vehicle for achieving
equality has met with resistance from those who feel that while
past preference for white America was wrong, present preference
for black America constitutes, not a solution to the problem, but
the substitution of one evil for another.
4
This paper will analyze the competing considerations in Amer-
ica's struggle for true equality for all its people. The basic premise
upon which the analysis will be made is that it is in the best interest
of the country to achieve equality among the races, at every level
of American society, as quickly as possible. This author views dis-
crimination and the present effects of past discrimination, as ex-
perienced by black America, as an evil facing Americans of every
1 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1969) thereinafter cited as REPORT ON
CIVIL DISORDERS].
2 BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY, (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines discrimination as ".. a failure
to treat all equally."
Editor's Note: Author's use of "wo/man" and "s/he" is to replace the American use of
"he" as the universal gender.
3 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972); United States v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). See generally REPORT ON CIVIL DIS-
ORDERS, supra note 1, at 231-52.
4See, e.g., Haskell, Legal Education on the Academic Plantation, 60 A.B.A.J. 203 (Feb.
1974); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World; Equality for the Negro - The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966-67).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVrEw
color. The sooner this country can rid itself of the evil, the sooner
it can be on its way to achieving a decent, orderly society of
free wo/men.
Discrimination and Effects of Discrimination Against Blacks
Is A Presently Existing Problem Which Must Be Resolved
Discrimination against the black wo/man is a part of Amer-
ica's present as well as a part of its history. Testimony of Harvey
Oostdyk, Educational Director of the New York Urban League,
before the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, re-
vealed that in the 1960's, while more than 50 per cent of all high
school graduates attended college, the comparable figure for disad-
vantaged high school graduates (many of whom are black) is only
8 per cent.5 While enrollments of blacks in four year colleges in-
creased by over 170 per cent in the 1960's, their enrollment con-
stitutes only 6.5 per cent although they constitute 12.4 per cent of
the college age group nationally.6 Although educational figures are
disturbing, the effects of discrimination are noticeable in even more
frightening ways on other levels of society.7
President Johnson recognized the link between discrimination
and civil disorder when he addressed the nation on June 27, 1967:
The only genuine, long range solution for what has happened
lies in an attack - mounted at every level - upon the
conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know
what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums,
poverty, disease, not enough jobs.6
The following month. President Johnson established the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders to answer three critical ques-
tions: What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to
prevent it from happening again? 9
What happened and why it happened were already known. While
media coverage exaggerated the event,' 0 citizens across the country
realized that their cities had been shaken. Examinations of why it
5 REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 250.
6 Peterson, College Admissions Quotas: Time to Decide If Whites are Victimized, N. Y.
Times, November 25, 1973, at E9, col. 1.
7 E.g., National Prisoner Statistics No. 42, Executions, 1930-1967, at 10-11 (1968), reveals
that 53 percent of those persons actually executed for conviction of capital offenses are non-
white, compared to the 11 per cent of non-whites in the total population. Justice Douglas
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1972) discusses ethnic disparity in final
dispositions for capital crimes: "In several instances where a white and a Negro were co-
defendants, who, under Texas law were given separate trials, the white was sentenced to life
imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the death penalty."
8 Address by Lyndon Baines Johnson to the Nation, June 27, 1967.
9 REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra Note 1, at 1.
10Id. at 201-213.
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happened revealed, or rather confirmed, that the black experience
in America left much to be desired.11 The incidents which triggered
the riots were symptoms, not causes. The causes ran deep into the
daily lives of blacks in cities North and South." Living conditions
were only an aspect of the frustration and despair that led to the
civil disorders of the sixties and while basic economics was obvi-
ously a motivating factor,13 the alienation of the black person from
the protective rewards of a law and order society made civil dis-
orders inevitable. 14 While it is not the purpose of this article to
examine the morality of racial violence and civil disorder, it is a
subject which should not be totally ignored. 15
Left to be answered was the question of prevention. The Presi-
dent had recognized the obvious in his June 27, 1967 address: elim-
ination of the causes.1 6 The National Advisory Commission focused
on four areas: employment, education, welfare, and housing. 7 In
employment, the Commission stressed the utility of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act 0 and affirmative action to hire and promote
by linking training with enforcement. 19 In the educational arena
much emphasis was placed on inequalities in primary and secondary
education, but higher education did not escape the Commission's at-
tention. Recognizing that the inequalities at lower levels of educa-
tion left college-aged minorities incapable of effective competition,
the Commission urged expansion of existing Upward-Bound pro-
grams of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Upward-Bound stu-
dents (students from poverty backgrounds) attend intensive sum-
mer sessions on college campuses and receive special assistance dur-
ing the school year.20 Recognizing that even expansion of Upward-
Bound would be inadequate compensation for previous secondary
111d. at 91-145.
12 Id. at 91-93 suggests eight basic causes: pervasive discrimination and segregation, black mi-
gration and white exodus, black ghettos, frustrated hopes, legitimation of violence, power-
lessness, incitement and encouragement of violence, and the police.
13 Clark & Clark, Denial of Rights to Black Citizens - A Speculation on the Relation to
Violence and Civil Disorders, 46 DENVER L.J. 63, 79 (1969) (rioters' desire to secure
goods was immediately apparent).
14 Id.
Is See generally Alioto, The Moral Basis of Violence, 44 NTRE DAME LAWYER 1045 (1968-
69); Mac Guigan, Civil Disobedience and Natural Law, 11 CATH. LAW. 118 (1965);
Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205 (1966) (the
author, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Richard
Nixon on December 9, 1971); Smith, The Legitimacy of Civil Disobedience as a Legal
Concept, 36 FoRDHAM L. REV. 707 (1967-68).
16 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
17 REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 229-263.
1842 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq. (1964).
19 REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS, sura note 1, at 234.
21Id. at 250.
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school inequalities, the Commission recommended an additional one
year of college preparation for disadvantaged youths.21 The Com-
mission did not deal specifically with inequalities in professional and
graduate-level education.
The author has proceeded this far without more than a men-
tion of the problem of reverse race discrimination because she feels
that these charges must be viewed in their historical perspective
rather than in a vacuum of legal thinking. The documentation of
past discrimination against minorities serves also to document its
counterpart: unfair advantages to non-minorities. If minorities are
underrepresented in higher levels of education it is safe to assume
that non-minorities are overrepresented. Stated simply, what society
has been taking from its minorities, it has been giving to its non-
minorities. The reverse discrimination aspect of affirmative action
is, in reality, the removal of that benefit which American society
has for so long bestowed, without question, upon its privileged
classes. The question, viewed in this light, becomes: "Is the removal
of a benefit, given for centuries to some at the expense of others,
truly a discrimination against that long-privileged class?"
The Prohibition Against Discrimination Protects All Persons
Although black persons have traditionally been on the receiv-
ing end of discriminatory practices, the prohibitions against dis-
crimination apply equally to protect all persons. Early thirteenth
amendment cases stressed its application to whites as well as
Negroes, despite its obvious purpose to eliminate existing Negro
slavery.2 The earliest civil rights legislation, enacted simultaneously
with the thirteenth amendment, stated: "all persons born in the
United States . . . are . . .citizens of the United States . . . [and]
shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Happily, this choice of words has not been interpreted to deny
protection to white citizens. It is, after all, thirteenth amendment
legislation and does not use the term "Negro" but rather "all per-
sons" in its delineation of scope.2
Contemporary civil rights legislation dropped the "white citizen"
standard, clearly stating, "All persons shall be entitled to . . . full
and equal enjoyment . . . without discrimination or segregation
21 Id.
2Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 90 (1872); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1906) (the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) restricted
its overruling of Hodges so as not to include its application of the thirteenth amendment
to all races).
2Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Star. 144, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970); Act
of April 9, 1866, c. 31, 14 Stat. 27, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
2 Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1323, 1326
(1952).
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on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin." 25 The
Higher Education Guidelines of Executive Order No. 1124626 state
positively:
The nondiscrimination requirements of the Executive Order
apply to all persons, whether or not the individual is a mem-
ber of a conventionally defined "minority group." In other
words, no person may be denied employment or related
benefits on grounds of his or her race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.2 7
The 88th Congress' concern over the possibility of its civil rights
legislation being interpreted to give preference to previously denied
minorities is evidenced by two sections of Title VII: Seniority or
merit system- Ability tests28 and Preferential treatment not re-
quired on account of numerical or percentage imbalance.9
It is in the application of these principles that the question of
reverse race discrimination arises, for Title VII grants affirmative
relief.30 Fashioning such relief in these situations necessitates a
balancing of the Act's express purpose of eliminating discrim-
25 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000a (a) (1964).
26 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65).
2 HIGHER EDUCATION GUIDELINES, Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65)
[hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 11,246).
'Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (h) (1964). Seniority or merit
system; ... Ability tests; ... Notwithstanding any other provision of this title £42 U.S.C.
§§2 0 00e - 2000e-17], it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work at defferent locations
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to give and act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test
provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, in-
tended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (j) (1964). Preferential treat-
ment not to be granted on account of existing numerical or percentage imbalance. Nothing
contained in this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§2000e - 2000e-17] shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee subject to this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 2 000e - 2000e-17] to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage or persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin
employed by an employer, referred or classified for employment by an employment
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organiza-
tion, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section or other area.
"Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (g) (1964), amended, 86 Star.
103 (March 1972). Injunctions; Appropriate affirmative action; Equitable relief; . . .
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
(Continued on next page)
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ination based on race (stated positively: to bring about Equal
Employment Opportunity) and the Act's proscription against prefer-
ential treatment.
The Problem Areas In Elimination of Discrimination
Bearing in mind the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the
evil against which it is aimed, courts have attempted to apply the
spirit of the law in a manner that is equitable to all.31 The courts
stress their appreciation for the fact that the issue comes before
it emotion-packed, dramatically affecting the lives of the parties
involved.32
Where not even de facto discrimination was proven, a school
board's attempt to racially and ethnically balance its faculty with
its school distribution, but which made it virtually impossible for
"other whites" to obtain employment or re-employment, was held to
be "the imposition of one form of racial discrimination in place of
another."33 In Auerbach v. African-American Teachers' Associa-
tion, Inc.,34 overcoming effects of previous discrimination was not in
issue. The defendant teachers society was fined $3,500.00 for abus-
ing and ejecting white teachers from a meeting held in the school
auditorium. In both cases discrimination against blacks was absent.
In Anderson the factor played a key role in the court's determina-
tion.35 In Auerbach it was irrelevant. Discrimination against the black
wo/man is well documented, 36 and where discrimination is found
courts must rectify the situation.37 The approach taken depends, of
course, on the facts of each case.
(Continued from preceding page)
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable
with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the admis-
sion or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstate-
ment, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason
other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of section 2000e-3 (a) of this title.
31 Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
32 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1178-79 (2nd Cit. 1972).
3 Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F.Supp. 248, 249 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
34356 F.Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
3 Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F.Supp. 248, 250 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3 See text accompanying notes 5-15 supra.
37 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Ironworkers Local
86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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Seniority
The effects of past discrimination are perhaps most apparent
in seniority situations where benefits are granted to a person who
has honestly earned them but denied to a person who, not being
hired because of his or her race, was denied even the opportunity
to earn them. This situation results in a perpetuation of discrimina-
tion. When faced with this problem the court in Local 189, United
Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States
went beyond the appearance of neutrality.39 While not allowing
white incumbents (who had received their seniority benefits through
prior preference) to be bumped from their jobs, the court nonethe-
less prohibited the defendant from awarding future jobs on the basis
of a system which "locks in" prior racial classifications. 40 In Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc.47 the court interpreted the allowable bona fide
seniority system42 to be one that incorporated no unnecessary re-
tardation of formerly excluded blacks.43 What at first blush may
appear to be discrimination against whites in the denial of benefits
which they earned, can be seen as merely the removal of advantages
earned under a system which unconstitutionally discriminated against
blacks.
Testing
Testing and job requirements in the hiring process present an-
other area in which whites feel they are now suffering a disad-
vantage." Tests are attacked by black persons for two reasons:
cultural bias5 and job-unrelatedness." Once a plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case of racial discrimination, usually by statistics,
4 7
3416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969).
39 Id. at 988.
401d.; accord, United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973).
41279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
4242 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).
4Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968).
"See generally Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A
(general picture is one of quite limited predictive power).
1598 (1969) (10-20% of Title VII litigation in this area).
4 5 See generally Dreger and Miller, Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and
Whites in the United States, 57 PsYcH. BULL. 361 (1960) (The search for a culture
free test is illusory); Hess, Controlling Cultural Influence in Mental Testing: An Experi-
mental Test, 49 J. OF ED. RESEARCH 53 (1955); McMurran (ed.), The Conditions for
Educational Equality, (Supp. Paper #34, 1971) (I.Q. tests discriminate against those
with backgrounds different from dominant group and those who have had insufficient
stimulation and development of their abilities).
46See generally GHISELLI, THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATIONAL APTITUDE TESTS 51 (1966)
(general picture is one of quite limited perdictive power).
47 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2nd Cir. 1972); Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Smith v. East Cleveland, 363 F.Supp.
1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
1974]
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the burden is on the defendant to prove that the test is job-related.8
Failure to prove the job-relatedness of the test results in its being
abandoned, and along with it go promotional lists of those who have
passed the test.49 Whites who have "worked diligently for years to
pass the . . . examinations and rise to a more responsible job"S
find the elimination of promotional lists, on which they have earned
a place, to be unfair. Indeed, in Chance v. Board of Examiners, one
such teacher furnished an "eloquent amicus brief and oral argu-
ment."51 In reaching an admittedly difficult decision, the court con-
sidered several factors: denying an injunction against use of the
tests would result in continuance of the already determined dis-
crimination; white teachers on the list could serve in acting ca-
pacities; minority persons whom the board had placed in acting
capacities because of their ability to perform might lose those jobs;
and neither the children nor the school system would suffer great
harm.52 The clearest argument in favor of the injunction and against
charges of unfair treatment by whites who had passed an admittedly
discriminatory test was that those teachers affected adversely:
... would not be denied "an equal opportunity in the future
to qualify under such examination procedures as are found
to be constitutionally permissible. '53
Paper Qualifications
Paper qualifications, such as the high school diploma, have like-
wise been held to have a discriminatory effect on minorities and
their use has been prohibited where defendant is unable to demon-
strate a relation between the qualification and job performance.M
Abandonment under such circumstances operates to remove an un-
fair advantage previously enjoyed by non-minorities rather than to
grant an unfair advantage to unqualified persons. The argument
that a wo/man is unqualified because s/he lacks a paper degree or
other requirement later found to be an invalid measure of qualifica-
tion is a contradiction in terms. It is an argument that the Griggs
court both anticipated and rejected. 55
4Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971).
49 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (1972).
so Id.
mId.
52 Id.
-330 F.Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), al'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (1972).
54 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
55 Id. at 428-29.
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That the objective of the courts has been to remove artificial
barriers rather than lower valid standards is demonstrated in Castro
v. Beecher56 and Spurlock v. United Airlines.57 In Castro the court
upheld a high school diploma requirement for the position of police
officer, stressing the police department's need for officers with a
high level of education and cited, inter alia, the recommendation of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice that "The ultimate aim . . . should be that all person-
nel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees."58
In Spurlock, requirements of a college degree and a minimum of five
hundred flight hours for applicants for the position of flight officer
were upheld even though a prima facie case of racial discrimination
had been made by plaintiff. The defendant carried its burden by
arguing that a college degree evidences an ability to cope with
vigorous training and refresher courses.5 The minimum hours re-
quirement was upheld on the basis of statistical evidence showing a
significantly higher failure rate among those with less than the
required number of hours.60
Affirmative Relief
In fashioning affirmative relief against continuation of effects
of past discrimination through present seemingly neutral practices,
courts have taken a variety of approaches. 61 Each case cited at the
appeals level squarely faced the question of reverse race discrim-
ination or minority preference. Carter v. Gallagher is most illus-
trative.62 The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education63 held the use of mathe-
matical ratios constitutionally acceptable as a "starting point in the
-6459 F.2d 725 (lst Cit. 1972).
-475 F.2d 216 (10th Cit. 1972).
S4Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cit. 1972).
59 Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (loth Cir. 1972).
60Id. at 218-19.
61 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th Cir.), 406 U.S. 950 cert. denied, (1972)
(modified district court order for absolute preference in immediate hiring of twenty
minority persons to order that one of every three persons hired in future be a minority
person until total of twenty minority persons hired); United States v. Ironworkers Local
86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (affirmed order of
recruitment of thirty percent black membership in apprentice programs); Local 53,
Int'l Ass'n of Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (affirmed
order of development of objective membership criteria and alternating referrals); United
States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (ordered
immediate hiring of six Negroes, then hiring of Negroes and whites on a one-to-one
ratio).
62Although Carter cited several Title VII cases as guiding the final affirmative order,
the action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and is discussed in terms of equal
protection rather than anti-preference.
63402 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
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process of shaping a remedy." 64 It was, however, unwilling to ap-
prove the district court's absolute preference scheme, viewing it as
"a present infringement on those nonminority group persons . .
equally or superiorly qualified" and as "implementation of one con-
stitutional guarantee by the outright denial of another. 6 5 Unable
to ignore the defendant's past discriminatory hiring policy, the
court settled on a "one minority to two nonminority" alternating
ratio.6  The court expressly held that in the absence of validation
studies of the tests used by defendant, the conclusion could not be
drawn that a minority person (or any person) with a low test score
was less qualified than a nonminority person (or any person) with
a high test score.67
Two dissenting judges felt that both the original and the
modified order constituted "employment preferences based on race
. . . prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment."' These judges ex-
pressed concern for nonminority applicants with equal or superior
qualifications.69 This position fails to account for the majority court's
finding that the tests used by defendants had not been validated and
therefore could not be used to determine the relative qualifications
of applicants.7 0 Faced with this situation and with the knowledge
that past discrimination had been practiced openly, the majority
court determined its primary function to be the elimination of
past discrimination against minorities and "making meaningful in
the immediate future the constitutional guarantees against racial
discrimination."71
The dissenting judges pointed out that present and future ap-
plicants are "in no way responsible for past discrimination. ' 72 While
it may be true that none of the individual applicants was directly
responsible for the previous discriminatory practices of the instant
defendants, it can be said with certainty that white persons in this
society have unfairly (although perhaps indirectly) benefited by past
racist practices. Opportunities for better and indeed more education
as well as employment have been open to them and their families.
"Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
65d. at 330.
6Id. at 331.
67Id.
6Id. at 332.
69 Id. This is the position taken by the dissenting judge in the original appeals
court decision which reversed in toto the district court's absolute preference for twenty
minority applicants. The majority opinion discussed at notes 61-66 was delivered on
petition for rehearing en banc.
7
o See text accompanying note 66 supra. See generally text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
71 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
72Id. at 332.
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These unfair advantages must somehow be equalized unless America
is prepared to write off a generation or two of minorities unfortunate
enough to have been born before even lip service was paid to the
notion of equality of dark-skinned and light-skinned persons.
Perhaps the approach taken by the Chance court, placement of
persons in an acting capacity until non-discriminatory job-related
tests can be developed, involves less danger of actual reverse dis-
crimination against an individual white applicant than do immediate,
permanent appointments. But removing oneself from the intimacy
of white individual versus black individual, and looking at the total
picture of discrimination against minorities, the conclusion is clear
that an overriding consideration or, perhaps, a basic objective in
this country must be to provide avenues for minorities to move im-
mediately into the mainstream of American life. That objective can-
not be accomplished until minorities are economically secure.
The Case for Higher Education
Employment
Universities and other institutions of higher education are em-
ployers as well as educators. As employers, they are subject to the
provisions of all pertinent civil rights laws. In addition, those insti-
tutions with federal contracts are subject to Executive Order No.
11,246.13 Conceptually, the Executive Order is much like Title VII.
Its proscription against discrimination applies to all persons.7 4 It
is a violation of the Order for an institution to practice reverse dis-
crimination.7 5 It does not require dilution of standards necessary
to function so long as the university is able to demonstrate the
standard's job-relatedness and there is no requirement that unquali-
fied persons be hired.7 6 The main distinction between Title VII and
Executive Order No. 11,246 is that while Title VII authorizes affir-
mative relief where an unlawful employment practice is found,
77
the Executive Order places on every federal contractor an Affirma-
tive Action requirement "to make additional efforts to recruit, em-
ploy and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded." 7
The Order recognizes that unless positive action "to overcome the
effects of systematic institutional . . . discrimination" is taken, "a
benign neutrality in employment . . . will . . . perpetuate the status
73 Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65).
74 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
75 HEW, HIGHER EDUCATION GUIDELINES, at 8 (1972).
76 Id. at 4.
77Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (g) (1964), amended, 86
Stat. 103 (1972).
78 HEW, HIGHER EDUCATION GUIDELINES, at 3 (1972).
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quo ante indefinitely. ' 79 Although the Executive Order was amended
to eliminate discrimination against women as well as minorities, this
discussion will concern race discrimination only, and provisions
which have application only to discrimination against women will
not be discussed.80
The university's first obligation is to determine whether "under-
utilization" of minorities exists; underutilization is defined as "having
fewer . ..minorities in a partcular job than would reasonably be
expected by their availability. '" 81 It is the university's responsibility
to develop specific goals and timetables to overcome all underutiliza-
tion. Factors involved in projecting a goal are: the extent of the
deficiencies, the availability of qualified minorities, and the expected
turnover in its workforce. 82 Techniques and procedures to locate qual-
ified members of previously disadvantaged groups must be adopted
and existing obstacles (discriminatory standards) must be removed.83
Failure to reach goals is not conclusive. However, the university
must determine the cause of the failure. Compliance is spoken of in
terms of both the letter and spirit of the law, and failure to comply
due to conditions somewhat out of the university's control, such as
an inaccurate estimate of turnover or a change in the overall em-
ployment market or unavailability within the desired group do not
constitute non-compliance so long as the record indicates that the
affirmative action requirements were followed. The Executive Order
distinguishes quotas which are rigid and exclusive measures of per-
formance from goals which are an indicator of probable compliance
and achievement."
The Executive Order is critical of the "old-boy" approach8 to
university hiring. While this and other traditional methods are not
proscribed by the Order so long as their effects can be mitigated,
active recruitment of minorities in both academic and non-academic
areas must be undertaken. Previously unexplored channels must be
located and used.8
79 Id.
801d. at 8 (anti-nepotism policies), at 12 (employment policies relating to pregnancy and
childbirth), at 13 (child care leave - makes leave available to men and women on an
equal basis), at 14 (child care - which, of course, will improve employment opportunities
for men and women within the university structure).
81 Id. at 3.
82 Id.
Mid. at 3 & 4.
4 Id. at 4.
85 Traditional word-of-mouth notification among personal friends within the profession.
Obviously, where a university has discovered underutilization it should not rely upon
closed-circuit recruitment processes.
86Id. at 5 & 6.
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All personnel policies and practices must be scrutinized. Re-
cruitment, hiring, placement, promotion, termination, conditions of
work, rights, and benefits (salary, leave policies, and fringe benefits)
must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.8 7 "Clusters" of
minorities in certain job classifications or departments is indicative
of such discrimination and "appropriate remedies must be afforded
those persons previously assigned in such manner."8 8 Back pay awards
as provided for in Title VII, the Equal Pay Act,89 and the National
Labor Relations Act90 will be pursued by the Executive Order enforce-
ment agency, the Department of Labor's Office for Civil Rights,
where employees were not protected by statute at the time of the
violation. 91
Admissions
Elimination of employment discrimination on both academic and
non-academic levels is, of course, only a part of the picture. Students
like to think that the primary purpose of the university is education
and, indeed, institutions of higher education were participating in
affirmative action admissions programs as early as the 1960's.92 The
political and economic climate of America in the 1970's made it
inevitable that these programs would come under attack since seats
in graduate and professional schools are at a premium and literally
thousands of highly qualified would-be lawyers, doctors and dentists
are turned away each year.
Attack upon affirmative action programs on the basis of an
alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is not new. In the employment arena such attacks were
made indirectly through appeal of court-ordered affirmative relief.
93
In the educational arena the attack is necessarily launched directly,
because educators have instituted affirmative action programs on
their own initiative rather than awaiting a court order to do so.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of De
Funis v. Odegaard94 educators, lawyers and the press predicted a final
17 1d. at 5-13.
88 Id. at 9.
89 Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1963), amending Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §201 et seq. (1968).
9"National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 et seg. (1964) formerly ch. 120, §101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947), formerly ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
91 HEW, HIGHER EDUCATION GUIDELINES, at 11 (1972).
" See text accompanying notes 20 and 21 supra.
"Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cit. 1969).
-482 W ash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot - ......------- U.S ............. 42
U.S.L.W. 4578 (U.S. April 12, 1974).
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answer to the questions presented by affirmative action programs.
Plaintiff, Marco De Funis, had applied to and was rejected by the
University of Washington School of Law for the class commencing
September 1971. Plaintiff's undergraduate junior-senior grade point
average was 3.71, his average LSAT score was 582 (512, 566, 668)
and his average writing score was 61 (62, 58, 64). These figures
were combined to produce a Predicted First Year Average (PFYA)
of 76.33. The policy of the defendant law school was, with few
exceptions, to accept all applicants with PFYA's over 77, to reject
all applicants with PFYA's under 74.5, and to reserve judgment on
those applicants with PFYA's between the two cutoff points. Ap-
plicants who indicated that they were Black, Chicano, American
Indian, or Filipino escaped this system. Regardless of their PFYA,
their applications were considered by members of the Admissions
Committee, selected presumably for their experience with minority
students. The minority applicants were considered competitively with
one another, never with the remaining applicants described above.
Thirty-six minority students with lesser grades and scores were
admitted in the year that plaintiff was rejected. De Funis alleged
he had wrongfully been denied admission to the law school and
asked the court to order defendants to admit and enroll him in the
class for which he had applied and, if defendants failed to do so,
that he recover damages of not less than $50,000.00. 95 The trial court
ruled that defendant had discriminated against plaintiff in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
granted injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Washington, in
reversing the superior court, framed a broad issue:
. . . whether the law school may, in consonance with the
equal protection provisions of . . . the federal constitu-
tion, consider the racial or ethnic background of appli-
cants as one factor in the selection of students.96
Support for an affirmative answer to an issue thus stated can
be drawn from cases involving elementary and secondary education,
which qualified the color-blind requirement of Brown v. Board of
Education97 to allow color classification for the purpose of achieving
equality." The question of whether any and all racial classification
is per se unconstitutional was answered in the negative; only in-
951d. at 1172. (Plaintiff also raised questions concerning the University's duty to give
preference to state residents. This issue was decided against plaintiff at trial and affirmed
on appeal).
96 1d. at 1171.
97347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9E.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir., en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
840 (1967); Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
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vidious racial classification is per se unconstitutional, and the classi-
fication here was not invidious." The court considered and rejected
the contention that invidious discrimination occurred because plain-
tiff and others were denied a "benefit." 100 The court was, however,
unable to find that the classification was "benign" and proceeded to
apply the compelling state interest standard of review 0 1 to find that
the heavy burden had been met.10 2
The defendant's rationale for its admissions policy was two-
fold: first, to obtain a reasonable representation from minorities
within its classes and second, to increase participation in the legal
profession by persons who, having suffered discrimination in the
past, are now grossly underrepresented1 °3 The court recognized the
need for correcting the shortage of minority attorneys, prosecutors,
judges, and public officials as an "undeniably compelling state inter-
est."1 4 Considered and rejected was the suggestion that the objec-
tive could be accomplished through the less restrictive alternative
of improving elementary and secondary education, recognizing that
eighteen years after the Brown decision, "minority groups are still
grossly underrepresented in law schools."10 5 In concluding that the
defendants' admission policy was not arbitrary and capricious, the
court stressed that no minority quota had been established and that
only qualified minority applicants were admitted.106 Less emphasis
on conventional standards in the minority admissions process was
explained by defendant Odegaard, University President, not as a
reduction in law standards but as a recognition that "conventional
standards are not good indicators and something more is
needed." 10 7
The dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of Washington
adhered to the proposition that "Only in individual accomplishment
can equality be achieved."1 s The Chief Justice in dissent doubted
9982 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1179.
100Id. at , 507 P.2d at 1181.
101 Id. at ------------, 507 P.2d at 1182.
112 Id. at -........... 507 P.2d at 1184-85.
103Id. at -------- 507 P.2d at 1175. Not until Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) was
it established that a state could not comply with the equal protection clause by providing
separate-but-equal law schools.
114 Id. at .------------ 507 P.2d at 1184.
105 Id.
10 Id. at --- - -------- 507 P.2d at 1185. This was established through testimony of the law school
dean. The trial court did not find otherwise.
107 Id. at ------------, 507 P.2d at 1186. See generally text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
18Id. at -.--------- 507 P.2d at 1197.
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the existence of prior racial discrimination"0 9 and both justices would
have had the majority hold that plaintiff was denied equal protec-
tion of the laws.11 0
After argument, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
declined to rule on the merits of the case, holding that because the
plaintiff was in his final quarter of law school the Court could not
"consistently with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, con-
sider the substantive constitutional issues tendered by the parties." '
Justice Brennan with whom Justices Douglas, White and Marshall
joined, dissented on the issue of mootness. He reasoned that any
number of natural causes could prevent De Funis from completing
the quarter and that by respondent's own admission, the petitioner
would then be subject to "some discretionary action by the Uni-
versity on such request [for admission for the remainder of his law
school education] "112
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas discussed the
merits of the case and indicated that he would have vacated the
Washington Supreme Court judgment and remanded for a new trial
on the issue, inter alia, of whether the LSAT in its present form
should be eliminated for racial minority applicants. Calling upon
his personal knowledge of cultural bias in admissions tests he rea-
soned that a school might constitutionally put racial minority ap-
plicants into a separate class for the purpose of probing their
capacities and potentials so that racial factors do not militate against
or in favor of any applicant.
Justice Douglas twice repeated the sentence, "The key to the
problem is consideration of such applications in a racially neutral
way."113 A racially neutral approach, he conceded, would require
more effort on the part of admissions committees than is necessary
when LSAT scores and undergraduate grades are the dominant
features of selection. But this approach, he emphasized, is required
by the equal protection clause. In rejecting the argument that there
exists a compelling state interest to justify racial discrimination as
practiced under any quota system, Justice Douglas makes it clear
that population equivalencies are racial barriers forbidden by the
Constitution. Although Justice Douglas would have remanded for
new trial, he seems to clearly state that the defendant-respondent's
admissions program constituted a reservation of some proportion of
the class for minority students. The fault in the admissions program
109Id. at --- - ------ 507 P.2d at 1189.
1Old. at ---- ----- 507 P.2d at 1199, 1201.
111 DeFunis v. Odegaard, U.S - , 42 U.S.L.W. 4578 (U.S. April 23, 1974).
112 1d. at 4588.
113 Id. at 4584, 4586.
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seems to be not that the PFYA was not weighted as heavily for
minority students, but that minority students were compared only
with one another. Citing cases from Brown to Swann, he concludes:
A segregated admissions process creates suggestions of
stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and
in the end it may produce that result despite its contrary
intentions. One other assumption must clearly be disap-
proved, that Blacks or Browns cannot make it on their indi-
vidual merit. That is a stamp of inferiority that a State is
not permitted to place on any lawyer.114
The substantive issues presented but not reached in De Funis
will surely confront the Court in the foreseeable future. The author
will not speculate whether the Court will adopt the approach of
Justice Douglas. It is clear, however, that if such an approach is
adopted, universities will be forced to expand their admissions pro-
grams far beyond what they are today, for clearly the equal protec-
tion clause will not allow a mere return to the mechanistic approach
of the PFYA for all students. The ability of the universities, already
struggling for existence, to expand the time and cost involved in
their admissions programs was not considered by Justice Douglas
and surely could not be used to justify discriminatory admissions.
Eventually, universities faced with a command from the Court to
select its students in a racially neutral manner could be forced to
select students by lot. Justice Douglas allowed for the possibility of
reserving a certain number of seats for selection by lot and indicated
that the court's inquiry would end when it could be found that there
was no "invidious" discrimination in the selection process.
Conclusion
The question of how the people in this country can achieve the
values established in our Constitution is not easily answered. For
only twenty-four years has a serious effort been made in that direc-
tion 115 and a great deal remains to be accomplished. Injustice has
been done and injustice must be remedied. If the price for achieve-
ment of constitutional values is inconvenience or sacrifice, the price
must be paid by Americans of every color. Employment and educa-
tion can no longer depend on performance on culturally biased tests
not proven to be related to the position sought. White Americans can
no longer name the game, stack the deck, and then demand, under
the guise of equal protection, to walk away with all of the prizes.
Justice Hale in his dissent in De Funis doubted that prior racial dis-
,14 Jd. at 4587.
11 The author views Brown v. Board of Education as the turning point, for the separate-but-
equal doctrine was nothing more than self-imposed ignorance of the realities of American
life.
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crimination existed.116 This author doubts that the proponents of
reverse discrimination, if given the obviously impossible opportunity,
would trade her/his place in society for the overprotected, over-
advantaged position of the minority person in America today.
Shirley E. Stewartt
116 See text accompanying note 109 supra; 82 Wash. 2d at --.-------- 507 P.2d at 1186.
t Law Review Editor; second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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